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IN THE WAKE OF LEDBETTER V. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER
COMPANY: APPLYING THE DISCOVERY RULE TO DETERMINE THE
START OF THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD FOR PAY DISCRIMINATION
CLAIMS
NANCY ZISK*
I. INTRODUCTION
Congratulations. You have been offered a renewal of your employment
contract and, with it, a salary increase. You wonder if anyone else has received a
raise, but you are afraid to ask. While at lunch with your co-workers, you feel
compelled to inquire whether anyone else received a raise, even though you
know it is not polite.1 If you do not ask, you may run the risk of losing the right
to bring a pay discrimination claim challenging your employer's decision to give
you a lower raise than it gave your male co-workers doing substantially similar
work. This is at least how it seems after the Supreme Court's decision in Ledbetter
v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.2
In Ledbetter, the Court held that a female employee's complaint of pay
discrimination was time-barred when she did not file her claim within a 180 day
period, because she discovered that her paychecks were lower than those of her
male co-workers in substantially similar jobs much later.3 In so holding, the
Court appeared to place an employee in the untenable position of having to see
what is "often hidden from sight"4 to bring a timely claim under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.5 Indeed, when Title VII's short limitations period6
collides with the prevailing "social norms" and employers' rules that prohibit or
discourage employees from discussing or comparing their salaries,7 employees
may lose the opportunity to vindicate their rights under Title VII.8 Immediately
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1. Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, "Love, Sex and Politics? Sure. Salary? No Way": Workplace
Social Norms and the Law, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 167, 168 *2004).
2. See 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007).
3. Id. at 2181 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
4. Id.
5. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 to e-17 (2008).
6. Under Title VII, a charge must be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) within 180 days of the alleged unfair employment practice unless the
complainant has first instituted proceedings with a state or local agency, in which case the period is
extended to a maximum of 300 days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).
7. Bierman & Gely, supra note 1, at 168.
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.

137

ZISK_FMT1.DOC

138 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

1/21/2009 12:42:50 PM

Volume 16:137 2009

after the decision was rendered, commentators warned of its implications and
Congress moved to limit its reach.9
The initial reaction to the decision, however, may have been unwarranted.
This article examines whether Ledbetter, in fact, requires an employee to violate
the "social norm" by asking co-workers how much they make to preserve his or
her right to challenge pay disparity.10 When read closely, the decision should
not lead to a major shift, if any shift at all, in the law as it existed before, and in
this regard the lower court rulings are consistent.11 It may be read, instead, as a
case lacking either in proof of discrimination or a plaintiff's failure to litigate the
case to prove discrimination.12 While over 1300 courts have cited the Ledbetter
decision in some capacity since its publication, its impact appears to be limited

9. The decision was rendered on May 29, 2007, and editorials were published two days later.
See, e.g., Editorial, Injustice 5, Justice 4, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2007, at A18; Editorial, Sterile Thinking on
Pay Equity, CHI. TRIB., June 4, 2007, at C18; Editorial, Life vs. The Law: by Reading Statutes Too Rigidly in
Rendering Opinions, The Supreme Court Can Be in Denial of Reality, L.A. TIMES, May 31, 2007, at A26.
On July 31, 2007, the House of Representatives passed a bill known as the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay
Act, which, if it becomes law, would amend Title VII and provide that "an unlawful employment
practice occurs, with respect to discrimination in compensation . . . when an individual is affected by
application of a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice . . . ." H.R. 2831, 110th Cong.
§ 3 (as passed by House, July 31, 2007). This language responds to Congress' concern that the
Ledbetter decision "undermines those statutory protections by unduly restricting the time period in
which victims of discrimination can challenge and recover for discriminatory compensation
decisions or other practices, contrary to the intent of Congress." Id. § 2. The Senate introduced a
similar bill, the Fair Pay Act of 2008, which is currently pending. S. 2945, 110th Cong. (2008). See also
Tristin K. Green, Insular Individualism: Employment Discrimination Law After Ledbetter v. Goodyear, 43
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353, 353 n. 4, 354 (2008) (citing editorials and other commentaries warning of
the decision's import and suggesting that "Ledbetter is part of a much deeper and more potentially
devastating conceptual shift that is taking hold in employment discrimination law"). More recent
decisions, however, portend a more favorable environment for the protection of employees' rights.
See, e.g., CBOCS W. Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct.1951 (2008) (interpreting a Reconstruction-era
statute known as Section 1981, which bars racial discrimination in employment, to include
protection against retaliation); Gómez-Pérez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct. 1931 (2008) (holding by a vote of six
to three that the section of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act that applies to federal
government employees gives them protection against retaliation for complaining about age
discrimination); Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395 (2008) (ruling that if an
employer claims that a "reasonable factor other than age" accounts for the disproportionately
negative impact that a layoff or other action has on older workers, it is up to the employer to prove
it, rather than up to the employees to disprove the validity of the defense); Fed. Express Corp. v.
Holowecki, 128 S. Ct. 1147 (2008) (holding that failure to file the proper form to make a complaint
with the EEOC does not deprive an employee of the ability to go into court later and file a lawsuit);
Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 128 S. Ct. 1140 (2008) (rejecting the employer's argument
that testimony of non-parties regarding the discrimination was never relevant and should always be
excluded).
10. Bierman &Gely, supra note 1, at 170.
11. See, e.g., Fed. Ins. Co. v. Albertson's Inc., No. C 06-04000 MHP, 2007 WL 2701915 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 13, 2007) (distinguishing Ledbetter and suggesting that decision will not be followed by other
California courts).
12. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007). Ledbetter did not contest
the lower court's ruling that there was insufficient evidence to prove that Goodyear had acted with
discriminatory intent in making the only two pay decisions that occurred within the statutorily
prescribed time period. The Ledbetter Court observed that the plaintiff made "no claim that
intentionally discriminatory conduct occurred during the charging period or that discriminatory
decisions occurring before that period were not communicated to her." Id. at 2169.
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by its very specific facts. This article examines the state of the law before and
after Ledbetter and concludes that the limitations period for any discrimination
claim should start only after the victim is or should be aware of the existence
and source of an injury; a determination which must be made on a case-by-case
basis.13 Section II examines the requirements for filing a timely claim of pay
discrimination and reviews Ledbetter's analysis of what kind of an act or
occurrence starts the running of the limitations period. Section III examines the
difficulty in identifying the discrete act that triggers the limitations period for a
pay discrimination claim under Title VII and the limited reach of the Supreme
Court's decision in Ledbetter. Section IV reviews the lower courts' application of
Ledbetter and, based on that review and the realities of the workplace, Section V
proposes a case-by-case application of the discovery rule for identifying when
the limitations period is triggered in a pay discrimination claim. In Section VII,
this article concludes that the limitations period for a pay discrimination claim
should be triggered when an employee discovers or should discover a disparity
in pay that violates Title VII, whether the act that leads to that discovery is a
decision to award raises or set salaries or when employees are talking at lunch
and someone mentions the size of his or another co-worker's paycheck.
II. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR FILING A TIMELY CLAIM OF PAY DISCRIMINATION
A. The Statutory Regime
Congress enacted a series of statutes "to address the pervasive problems of
employment discrimination."14 These laws include Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,15 Section 1981 of the Civil War Reconstruction statutes,16 the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),17 the Equal Pay Act (EPA),18
and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).19 While the statutes
define different types of discrimination, each addresses discrimination in
employment and defines a limitations period in which an employee can bring a

13. See Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedren & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1386 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting
the application of the discovery rule to a Title VII claim and defining accrual of such a claim "as soon
as a potential claimant either is aware, or should be aware, of the existence of and source of an
injury").
14. MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & REBECCA HANNER WHITE, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 1 (7th ed. 2008)
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000) (prohibiting discrimination in employment based upon race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000) (ensuring that all persons have the same right to make and enforce
contracts, including the making, performance, modification, and termination of employment
contracts).
17. 29 U.S.C.§ 621 (2000) (prohibiting discrimination in employment based upon age). Accord 29
U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2000) (prohibiting gender-based discrimination in compensation). The
EPA does not protect other classifications, like race or national origin, like Title VII does. See § 2000e2 (prohibiting discrimination in employment based upon race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000).
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claim.20 With Title VII defining the "paradigm," the first step in determining
whether a claim is timely under any statute is determining when the
discriminatory act takes place.21 To do that, one must "identify with care the
specific employment practice that is at issue."22 Once identified, the
determination of when the employment practice "occurs" will define the time for
filing a charge of employment discrimination.23 Eluding precise definition, the
Supreme Court has explained that an act occurs "on the day that it 'happened.'"24
Similarly imprecise is a lower court's suggestion that a discrete act of
discrimination occurs when it "takes place."25 This imprecision may allow for the
necessary flexibility when faced with the various ways and the differing
contexts in which employment discrimination arises. Indeed, the Supreme Court
affirmed this when addressing the question of when a discriminatory act
"occurs:" "The answer varies with the practice."26 Therefore, a factual analysis of
any case will be critically important in determining when a limitations period
begins.27

20. Under Title VII, a charge must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unfair
employment practice unless the complainant has first instituted proceedings with a state or local
agency, in which case the period is extended to a maximum of 300 days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)
(2000). The EEOC may then investigate the claim and either pursue the claim or issue a right to sue
letter, which entitles a complainant to file suit in federal district court. Id. See also Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2166–67 (2007). The ADEA and the ADA, like Title VII,
require a plaintiff to file a charge with the EEOC as a prerequisite to bringing suit in federal district
court. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2000). Title I of the ADA incorporates the
other requirements of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a), but the ADEA permits a complainant to file suit
after sixty days without first receiving a right to sue letter from the EEOC. 29 U.S.C § 626(d)(2)
(2000). See, e.g., Hodge v. N.Y. Coll. of Podiatric Med., 157 F.3d 164, 168–69 (2d Cir. 1998). The EPA
does not require a plaintiff first to file an administrative complaint and has a two-year statute of
limitations for violations that are not "willful" and a three-year period for violations that are
"willful." 29 U.S.C. § 216 (2000) (applying the statute of limitations defined in 29 U.S.C. § 255(a)
(2000)).
21. MICHAEL J.ZIMMER, CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & REBECCA HANNER WHITE, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 595 (7th ed. 2008).
22. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2167 (citing Nat'l R.R Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110–11
(2002)). See also Lorance v. AT&T Tech., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 904 (1989) ("Assessing timeliness therefore
'requires us to identify precisely the "unlawful employment practice" of which [petitioners]
complai[n].'") (quoting Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 257 (1980)).
23. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2165. To challenge an employment practice, Title VII requires an
employee to file a charge within either 180 or 300 days "after the alleged unlawful employment
practice occurred . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1). If an employee fails to submit a timely charge, the
employee will be barred from challenging the alleged discriminatory conduct in court. Ledbetter, 127
S. Ct. at 2165. Other discrimination statutes have limitations periods of other lengths, but all require
a complainant to file a charge within a certain time period or be barred from bringing the claim. See,
e.g., Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 113, 117–18 (3d Cir. 1985), aff'd, 482 U.S. 656, (1987)
("Because there is no specified federal statute of limitations applicable to § 1981 cases, the district
court was required to use the state limitations period most analogous to the civil rights cause of
action."). See also Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268 (1985) (selecting the "most analogous state statue
of limitations" to apply to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim) (internal citation omitted).
24. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 110 (quotes in original).
25. Brantley v. Muscogee County Sch. Dist., No. 4:06-CV-89, 2008 WL 794778, at *6 (M.D. Ga.
Mar. 20, 2008).
26. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 110, 122.
27. Id.
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B. Identifying the "Act" or "Occurrence" that Triggers the Start of the
Limitations Period
In some cases, certain discriminatory acts are "easy to identify."28 They
include acts "such as termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer or refusal
to hire."29 Other acts, in contrast, may be difficult to discern. Specifically, an "act"
of pay discrimination, like the one at issue in Ledbetter, may be particularly hard
for an employee to identify.30 Despite the factual difference from a pay disparity
case, the Ledbetter Court relied on cases involving obvious acts like termination
or a denial of tenure without analyzing how one rule for all cases will affect
victims of pay discrimination.31
In United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans,32 the employee, as described by the
Ledbetter Court, "was forced to resign because the airline refused to employ
married flight attendants, but she did not file an EEOC charge regarding her
termination. Some years later, the airline rehired her but treated her as a new
employee for seniority purposes."33 The employee sued, recognizing that any
suit based on the original discrimination was time-barred but arguing that the
airline's refusal to give her credit for her prior service gave "present effect to the
past illegal act and thereby perpetuate[d] the consequences of forbidden
discrimination."34 The Court noted that the airline's "seniority system [did]
indeed have a continuing impact on her pay and fringe benefits,"35 but held that
the discriminatory act was the employee's forced termination, which occurred
outside the limitations period.36 Despite the difference between a forced
termination and the pay disparity that grew gradually over a term of years, the
Ledbetter Court described the Evans precedent as speaking "directly" to the
point.37

28. Id. at 114. See, e.g., Smithers v. Wynne, No. 07-11945, 2008 WL 53245, at *2 (11th Cir. Jan. 4,
2008) (claims of being passed over for promotion are allegations of discrete acts).
29. Nat'l R.R Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)
(2000) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire or
to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . "). See also Smithers, 2008 WL 53245, at *2 (plaintiff's claims
of being passed over for promotion are allegations of discrete acts); Mansourian v. Bd. of Regents of
Univ. of Cal. at Davis, No. 2-03-02591, 2007 WL 3046034 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2007) (holding that being
excluded from a wrestling team is akin to a claim of termination and failure to hire or promote and
thus appropriately characterized as discrete acts).
30. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct 2162, 2178–79 (2007) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) ("Pay disparities often occur, as they did in Ledbetter's case, in small increments; cause to
suspect that discrimination is at work develops only over time."). The difficulty of discerning when
pay discrimination occurs is discussed more fully below. See infra Part III.
31. See Lorance v. AT&T Tech., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989); Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250
(1980); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
32. Evans, 431 U.S. at 553.
33. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2167(citing Evans, 431 U.S. at 554–55).
34. Evans, 431 U.S. at 557.
35. Id. at 558.
36. Id.
37. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2168 (2007).
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The Ledbetter Court also relied on Del. State Coll. v. Ricks,38 with facts
distinguishable from Ledbetter, but which the Court found "[e]qually
instructive."39 In that case, a college librarian, Ricks, alleged that he had been
discharged because of his national origin.40 At some point outside the limitations
period, Ricks was denied tenure but was given a final, nonrenewable one-year
contract that expired a little over a year after his tenure was denied.41 He
delayed filing a charge with the EEOC until almost a year after the denial of his
tenure, but he argued that the EEOC charging period ran from the date of his
actual termination rather than from the date when tenure was denied.42 Holding
that the limitations period began to run when the "tenure decision was made
and communicated," the Court held that the employee's claim was out of time.43
Unlike the plaintiffs in Evans and Ricks, the plaintiff in Ledbetter did not suffer
constructive termination or denial of tenure—things that she would have
understood to be adverse job action. She did not even suffer a reduction in pay.
Indeed, in some of the years in which she received negative evaluations that,
according to the appellate court and affirmed by the Supreme Court, triggered
the limitations period, she still received a raise in pay.44 Her negative
performance evaluations only gradually led to the differential in pay and her
loss was only obvious when she compared her pay with the salaries of men in
similar jobs.45 It took years, in fact, for the differential to become obvious.46
The Ledbetter Court also relied on Lorance v. AT & T Technologies, Inc.47
There, the defendant employer changed the way in which seniority was
calculated under a collective bargaining agreement.48 Before the change, all
employees at the plant in question accrued seniority based simply on years of
employment at the plant.49 Under the new agreement, as described in Ledbetter,
"seniority for workers in the more highly paid (and traditionally male) position
of 'tester' depended on time spent in that position alone and not in other
positions in the plant."50 This affected female testers several years later when,
during an economic downturn, they were laid off due to low seniority as
calculated under the revised agreement.51 Their layoffs prompted their claims
alleging that the changes in the collective bargaining agreement had been
adopted with discriminatory intent "'to protect incumbent male testers and to

38. Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980).
39. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2168.
40. Ricks, 449 U.S. at 254.
41. Id. at 252–53.
42. Id. at 254.
43. Id. at 258.
44. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169, 1173 (11th Cir. 2005), aff'd, 127 S.
Ct. 2162 (2007).
45. Id. at 1173–74 (11th Cir. 2005), aff'd, 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007).
46. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2178 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See infra Part III.
47. Lorance v. AT & T Tech., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989).
48. Id. at 902.
49. Id. at 901–02.
50. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2168 (2007) (citing Lorance, 490
U.S. at 902).
51. Lorance, 490 U.S. at 902.
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discourage women from promoting into the traditionally-male tester jobs,' and
that '[t]he purpose and the effect of this manipulation of seniority rules has been
to protect male testers from the effects of the female testers' greater plant
seniority and to discourage women from entering the traditionally-male tester
jobs.'"52 Here again, the "one-time discrete act"53 is easily distinguished from
Ledbetter's gradual loss of pay when compared with her male counterparts.54 In
Lorance, it was apparent to the employees that "each petitioner had earned the
right to receive a favorable position in the hierarchy of seniority among
testers . . . and respondents eliminated those rights" when the defendant
employer changed the seniority system in the collective bargaining agreement.55
It was this "diminution in employment status" of which the employees were
fully aware, and missing from the Ledbetter decision, that started the running of
the limitations period.56
The Court also noted Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan.57 There the
employee was faced with a number of discrete acts, each separately
discriminatory, and each "a separate actionable 'unlawful employment
practice.'"58 Some of the acts were challenged within the statutory limitations
period and others were not, and the Court made clear that only the discrete acts
that "occurred" within the appropriate time period could be grounds for
complaint.59 The Court distinguished the employee's claims of hostile work
environment as "different in kind from discrete acts. Their very nature involves
repeated conduct."60 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the "'unlawful
employment practice' . . . cannot be said to occur on any particular day. It occurs
over a series of days or perhaps years and, in direct contrast to discrete acts, a
single act of harassment may not be actionable on its own."61
Pay discrimination claims may be more like the hostile environment claims
than the claims in Evans, Ricks and Lorance.62 Indeed, the facts in Ledbetter are
more similar to those found in a case like Morgan and its description of a hostile
environment claim, which is created "over a series of days or perhaps years."63
Like the gradual creation of a hostile working environment, pay discrimination
may take years to develop and may take longer than that before the affected

52. Id. at 903 (quoting plaintiffs' complaint).
53. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2183 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
54. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
55. Lorance v. AT & T Tech., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 905–06 (1989).
56. Id. at 906. The Lorance decision is no longer effective, repudiated by Congress' amendment
to the Civil Rights Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2) (2000). In that amendment, Congress made explicit
that "an unlawful employment practice occurs . . . when the seniority system is adopted, when an
individual becomes subject to the seniority system, or when a person aggrieved is injured by the
application of the seniority system or provision of the system." Id.
57. 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
58. Id. at 114 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2).
59. Id. at 115.
60. Id. (internal citation omitted).
61. Id.
62. See Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980); Lorance v. AT&T Tech., Inc., 490 U.S. 900
(1989); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
63. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115 (2002).
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employees are aware of that disparity.64 Therefore, the limitations period, and
the triggering of it, should be analyzed in reference to these claims, rather than
to the more discrete termination, denial of tenure or other more obvious
"diminution in job status."65 The problem grows even thornier for the employee
faced with pay decisions that are not shared among employees, as is often the
case.66 The facts in Ledbetter illustrate the difficulty in identifying the triggering
act.67
III. THE DIFFICULTY IN IDENTIFYING THE DISCRETE ACT OR OCCURRENCE IS
ILLUSTRATED BY THE FACTS IN LEDBETTER
A. The Ledbetter Facts
In Ledbetter, the plaintiff sued her employer for pay discrimination.68 The
plaintiff was a supervisor at Goodyear Tire and Rubber's plant in Gadsden,
Alabama, from 1979 until her retirement in 1998.69 She worked for the latter part
of her career as an area manager, "a position largely occupied by men."70 When
she began as a manager, her salary was commensurate with the salaries earned
by men in the same jobs, but over time, "her pay slipped in comparison to the
pay of male area managers with equal or less seniority."71 She claimed she
received poor performance evaluations "because of her sex" and that "as a result
of these evaluations her pay was not increased as much as it would have been if
she had been evaluated fairly."72

64. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2181 (2007) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
65. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169, 1174, aff'd, 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2181
(2007).
66. See Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, "Love, Sex and Politics? Sure. Salary? No Way": Workplace
Social Norms and the Law, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 167, 168 (2004).
67. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2166. The identification of the triggering act was not before the Court
in Ledbetter. The plaintiff did not raise the issue of when the statute of limitations actually began to
run or should have begun to run, despite evidence suggesting that she did not discover—and could
not have discovered—the discrimination until years after the discrimination had occurred. As noted
by the dissent: "Pay disparities often occur, as they did in Ledbetter's case, in small increments; cause
to suspect that discrimination is at work develops only over time." Id. at 2178–79 (Ginsberg, J.,
dissenting). The record in Ledbetter also reflected that the plaintiff "had only limited access to
information regarding [her] colleagues' earnings," making it even more difficult to know of the
discriminatory disparity in pay. Id. at 2182.
68. Id. at 2165. The plaintiff made several claims, under both the EPA and Title VII. The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the EPA claims but allowed the
claims under Title VII to proceed to trial. Id. Under the EPA, the plaintiff's claim might have
survived a motion for summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds because, under the EPA,
"each alleged discriminatory paycheck may be considered a new, discreet discriminatory action."
Delima v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 06-328-JE, 2008 WL 1882842 at *20 (D. Or. Apr. 23, 2008)
(internal citations omitted). The plaintiff did not pursue this issue on appeal, so the Supreme Court
did not address it. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2165.
69. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2178 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 2166 (majority opinion).
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The discrepancy between Lilly Ledbetter's pay and the pay of others took
years to grow.73 This alone might have made it difficult for Ledbetter to identify
a triggering point for the limitations period to begin to run.74 However, a bigger
impediment to identifying the discrimination and recognizing that the period
for filing a claim had begun may have been due to the fact that she continued to
receive pay increases even after receiving negative performance evaluations.75
As explained by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, with one exception, her
supervisor "consistently ranked Ledbetter at or near the bottom of her coworkers in terms of performance."76 Despite these negative evaluations,
however, her supervisor "suggested, and she received, a 5.28% increase over her
existing salary, the largest percentage increase given to any Area
Manager . . . ."77 Thus, it would be difficult to recognize that these evaluations
amounted to "acts" or "occurrences" triggering the limitations period.78
In addition to the pay increases she received, Ledbetter also got mixed
messages from her supervisors about the reasons for their salary decisions.
When she did not receive a raise one year, she was told that her performance
was "sub-standard"79 and there was no indication that the negative evaluation
was based on her sex.80 Moreover, her denial of a pay raise occurred in the midst
of employee layoffs, which included a "long list" of people in departments all
over the plant, so she was encouraged simply to retain her employment.81 Far
from a "diminution in job status" required to start the running of a limitations
period, Ledbetter might well have thought that her status was secure.82
B. The Litigation and What the Court Did Not Decide
After several years had passed, when Ledbetter was receiving paychecks
that were smaller than those of her male counterparts, she filed a claim for
discriminatory pay disparity. The district court, over the objections of the
defendant employer, allowed Ledbetter's Title VII claim to proceed to trial.83 The
jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, finding, that it was "more likely
than not that Defendant paid Plaintiff an unequal salary because of her sex."84
Based on its conclusion, the jury recommended damages for back pay, mental

73. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169, 1173–74 (11th Cir. 2005), aff'd, 127
S. Ct. 2162 (2007).
74. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2178–79 (2007) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
75. Ledbetter, 421 F. 3d at 1173–74 (11th Cir. 2005), aff'd, 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2178 (2007).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2182 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
79. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169, 1174 (11th Cir. 2005), aff'd, 127 S.
Ct. 2162, 2178 (2007).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1175.
84. Id. at 1176 (quoting jury's special verdict form).
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anguish and punitive damages.85 In response to the defendant's argument that
the claim was time-barred, the court said simply that the "jury's finding that
Plaintiff was subjected to a gender disparate salary is abundantly supported by
the evidence . . . ."86
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's
decision not to grant the defendant judgment as a matter of law, finding that the
evidence was insufficient to prove that discriminatory intent motivated the only
two pay decisions that were made within the limitations period.87 Importantly,
the plaintiff did not seek review of this holding on appeal.88 She relied, instead,
on the receipt of disparate pay to justify her claims and to bring them within the
limitations period.89 The question before the Supreme Court was limited to:
"Whether and under what circumstances a plaintiff may bring an action under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 alleging illegal pay discrimination when
the disparate pay is received during the statutory limitations period, but is the
result of intentionally discriminatory pay decisions that occurred outside the
limitations period."90
In response, the Supreme Court held that Ledbetter's claim was untimely
because the "pay-setting decision," rather than the receipt of the paychecks
resulting from that decision, is the discrete act that started the running of the
limitations period.91 However, the Court did not clarify what the precise "paysetting decision" had been, or how that decision would have been understood by
the plaintiff, since these questions were not before the Court.92 The Court,
therefore, did not have to decide whether pay-setting decisions that were within
the limitations period were, in fact, discriminatory or were, for that matter, even
the kinds of "acts" or "occurrences" that would start the limitations period
running. The plaintiff conceded that no discrimination took place during the
limitations period and that ended the matter for the Court: "Because Ledbetter
did not file timely EEOC charges relating to her employer's discriminatory pay
decisions in the past, she cannot maintain a suit based on that past
discrimination at this time."93

85. Id. The district court denied Goodyear's motion for judgment as a matter of law but remitted
the entire award to $360,000, including the statutory maximum of $300,000 in compensatory and
punitive damages and $60,000 in back pay.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1189.
88. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2166 (2007).
89. Id.
90. Id. (quoting plaintiff's Petition for Certiorari).
91. Id. at 2165.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2176.
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IV. LEDBETTER'S IMPACT ON LOWER COURT DECISIONS
A. Ledbetter's Application to Cases Involving Discrete Acts
Over 1300 courts have cited the Ledbetter holding.94 Many relied on it to
dismiss claims where the plaintiff failed to file the claim within the appropriate
limitations period triggered by a "discrete act" of discrimination.95 Although
many of the cases did not concern issues of pay discrimination but more obvious
"discrete acts" of discrimination, other courts did address pay discrimination
claims. In these cases the courts directly applied Ledbetter's holding when there
were "discrete acts" to trigger the limitations period. For example, the District
Court in the District of Columbia recently considered whether a complaint was
timely filed under the ADEA.96 In that case, the plaintiffs' complaint arose in
connection with a change from one pay system to another. Under the new
system, each employee was categorized into a particular "pay band," which
defined a salary range for which each employee in the category would be
eligible, and the employer was able to adjust that range on an annual basis.97
The employees who were entitled to raises received them in different packages,
either over the course of the year or in a lump sum. Based on these differences,
the plaintiffs alleged that the older employees were compensated less favorably,
and the employer intended this result.98 Although the employees argued that
the limitations period began when they first began receiving their pay raises, the
court relied on Ledbetter to hold that the limitations period started when the pay
bands were set.99
94. See, e.g., Carter v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 503 F.3d 143 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding
that plaintiff's filing an EEOC questionnaire within 180 days of alleged sexual discrimination
provided the defendant adequate notice of claim and was timely filed); Vollemans v. Town of
Wallingford, 928 A.2d 586 (Conn. App. 2007) (concluding that the time for filing an age
discrimination claim begins on the day of actual termination and not on the day defendants
provided plaintiff notice of his termination).
95. See, e.g., Smithers v. Wynne, 2008 WL 3245 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding, as a matter of law, that
non-promotion claims are allegations of discrete acts and are time-barred if not brought within the
statutory limitations period); Dela Cruz v. Piccari Press, 521 F. Supp. 2d 424 (Ed. Pa. 2007) (holding
that a plaintiff may not assert a retaliation allegation not mentioned in the timely filed EEOC
complaint because the defendants were not put on notice of the retaliation allegation).
96. Coghlan v. Peters, 555 F. Supp. 2d 187 (D.D.C. 2008). The ADEA "provides a federal
government employee two alternative avenues to judicial redress." Id. Like under Title VII, an
employee may bring his claim directly to federal court "so long as, within 180 days of the allegedly
discriminatory act, he provides the [EEOC] with notice of his intent to sue at least 30 days before
commencing suit." 29 U.S.C. § 633a(c)–(d) (2000). Alternatively, an employee may choose to pursue
his claims administratively in the first instance and then file suit in federal court if he is dissatisfied
with the results of the administrative process. 29 U.S.C. § 633a(b)–(c). As the Coghlan court
explained, under the second alternative, employees must contact an EEOC counselor "within 45 days
of the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory or, in the case of personnel action, within 45
days of the effective date of the action." Coghlan, 555 F.Supp. 2d at 191 (quoting 29 C.F.R. §
1614.105(a)(1)). Accordingly, if an employee's complaint relies on "conduct that occurred more than
45 days prior to the initiation of administrative action," it will be time-barred. Coghlan, 555 F. Supp.
2d at 191 (quoting Velikonja v. Ashcroft, 355 F. Supp. 2d 197, 204 (D.D.C. 2005).
97. Coghlan, 555 F. Supp. 2d at 192–93.
98. Id. at 193.
99. Id. at 198.
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Adhering to the Supreme Court's directive, the district court "drew a sharp
distinction between discriminatory pay-setting decisions" that are "intentional
acts that 'consummate' a discriminatory pay practice—and 'subsequent
nondiscriminatory acts that [merely] entail adverse effects resulting from' those
decisions."100 In contrast to the Ledbetter Court, which did not consider whether
the "pay-setting decisions" actually put the employee on notice that the
limitations period for her claim had begun to run, the court in Coghlan squarely
addressed the issue. Looking for the "intentional acts that 'consummate' a
discriminatory pay practice,"101 the district court concluded that they were the
employer's annual decisions that set the pay ranges because, after those
decisions were made, "it was a foregone conclusion" what the employees' salaries
would be.102 The court concluded, therefore, that any claim made after the
limitations period had expired from the date of those decisions were timebarred.103 These facts contrast sharply with the facts in Ledbetter where, at the
time of her performance evaluations, it was not a "foregone conclusion" that her
pay would be less than male employees with similar jobs. To the contrary, after
at least one negative evaluation, she received a raise.104
B. Avoiding Ledbetter's Application in Cases Where the Triggering Act is Hard
to Discern
In cases where an employer's acts and the discriminatory nature of them
are harder to discern, courts have been reluctant to apply Ledbetter. Indeed, one
California court described the holding as a "rather cramped interpretation of pay
discrimination" and refused to apply it, suggesting that other California courts
will not follow it either.105 In Fed. Ins. Co. v. Albertson's Inc.,106 the court decided
that the Ledbetter decision did not apply to the facts before it. It could have
limited its discussion of the case to just that, but instead, the court noted that
"there is no authority as of this date that California courts will adopt this rather
cramped interpretation of pay discrimination, given the sharp dissent of four
members of the Court."107 Careful to limit its observation to state courts only, the
court noted that "California courts have not adopted or applied Ledbetter to cases

100. Id. (quoting Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2169–70 (2007)).
101. Id.
102. Id. (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 199–200. See also Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8 (1981) (charging period runs from
the date when "the operative decision was made—and notice given—in advance of a designated date
on which" adverse consequences would occur) (emphasis added) (relying on Del. State Coll. v.
Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980)); Denman v. Youngstown State Univ., 545 F. Supp. 2d 671 (N.D. Ohio 2008)
(employee alleging facts fundamentally distinguishable from those in Ledbetter, because employer's
decision to deny Denman's raise and non-renew her contract are clearly discrete acts).
104. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169, 1173 (11th Cir. 2005), aff'd, 127 S.
Ct. 2162 (2007). See Chardon, 454 U.S. at 8 (charging period runs from the date when "the operative
decision was made—and notice given—in advance of a designated date on which" adverse
consequences would occur) (emphasis added).
105. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Albertson's Inc., No. 06-04000, 2007 WL 2701915, at *4 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
106. Id.
107. Id. at *4 n.3.
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arising under state law. Thus, it may well be that even on facts similar to those
in Ledbetter the California courts would rule differently."108
While not explicitly refusing to follow Ledbetter, one court of appeal in
California refused to apply it and went to great lengths to distinguish the facts
of the case before it from the facts in Ledbetter. In Hammond v. County of L.A.,109
the plaintiff had been a nursing instructor with the Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Department who claimed that a new supervisor discriminated against her on the
basis of her race and age.110 The employee alleged that this supervisor replaced
her as an instructor in the classroom with "new people and young people." 111
She also alleged that her supervisor made derogatory racial remarks and
retaliated against plaintiff for telling the supervisor's supervisor about these
problems.112 The record reflected that there was "ongoing harassment and
discrimination" against the plaintiff.113
The defendant contended that the plaintiff's claims were barred by the
statute of limitations under the state's Fair Employment and Housing Act.114
Under that statute, a complainant has one year "from the date upon which the
alleged unlawful practice or refusal to cooperate occurred."115 To interpret the
statute, the California court looked to interpretations of Title VII.116 It considered
the Supreme Court's decision in Ledbetter but did not apply it to the facts before
it.117 In an effort to distinguish Ledbetter, the Hammond court noted that "[u]nlike
the supervisors in Ledbetter," the supervisor in the case before it "did not just
make a single decision based on age or race outside the limitations period that
continued to affect plaintiff adversely during the limitations period."118 In
contrast, said the court, the supervisor in Hammond "initially removed plaintiff
from the classroom in early 2002, but then allowed her to teach classes on a
sporadic basis . . . ."119
The California court could have decided that the supervisor's initial
decision to take the employee out of the classroom was the same type of
decision made by the Ledbetter supervisor to evaluate her poorly for
discriminatory reasons. If the court had done so, the employee's claims would
have been time-barred.120 To avoid that result, the court instead decided that,

108. Id.
109. 71 Cal. Rptr. 3d 386 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 390.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 392.
114. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12900 (West 2008).
115. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12960(d) (West 2008).
116. Hammond v. County of L.A., 71 Cal. Rptr. 3d 386, 398 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) ("Our courts
frequently turn to federal authorities interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . for
assistance in interpreting the FEHA and its prohibition against sexual harassment.") (citations
omitted).
117. Id. at 399–400.
118. Id. at 400.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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despite the supervisor's decision to demote the employee, the supervisor's
continued actions supported the employee's claims.121
Other courts have also avoided the result in Ledbetter, finding a variety of
ways to distinguish the facts in the cases before them.122 In O'Grady v. Middle
Country Sch. Dist. No. 11, the court considered an employee's claim that every
time she received a payment of her health benefit costs under an employment
retirement plan, her former employer discriminated against her on the basis of
her age.123 She brought suit under the ADEA, which has a limitations period
similar to the one in Title VII.124 The defendant employer argued that the
plaintiff's claim was time-barred, based on the fact that the retirement plan had
been adopted years before the plaintiff filed suit and the employee filed suit
over eight years after she retired.125 In response, the plaintiff argued that every
time she received payment from the retirement plan, a new cause of action
accrued.126 The plaintiff in O'Grady, unlike the Ledbetter plaintiff, argued and
proved that the retirement plan was itself discriminatory.127 Distinguished in
this way from Ledbetter, the plaintiff's claim survived the defendant's argument
to bar the claim.128 In its holding, the court relied on the Supreme Court's
suggestion that "Ledbetter's paychecks may have retriggered the limitations
period if her employer had issued paychecks using a discriminatory pay
structure" but that issue was not before the Ledbetter Court.129 By relying on the
"discriminatory pay structure" that was defined by the Supreme Court in
Bazemore v. Friday,130 the O'Grady court limited Ledbetter's reach.131 Other courts
have done the same, convinced that "Bazemore is more applicable to this case
than Ledbetter," saving the plaintiff's claim.132 Indeed, the Supreme Court was
careful to explain that its holding in Ledbetter "was not intended to overturn
Bazemore v. Friday, which was distinguished on the grounds that it involved an

121. Id.
122. O'Grady v. Middle Country Sch. Dist No. 11, 556 F. Supp. 2d 196, 199–200 (E.D.N.Y 2008).
123. Id.
124. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2000). See Ruhling v. Tribune Co.,
No. CV 04-2430, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116, at *24 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2007) ("Under Title VII and the
ADEA, a plaintiff must file an administrative charge . . . within 300 days after a claim accrues.").
125. O'Grady, 556 F. Supp. 2d at 199.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 199–200 (quoting Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2175
(2007)).
130. 478 U.S. 385 (per curiam ) (holding that the receipt of paychecks based on a discriminatory
pay structure does retrigger the limitations period).
131. O'Grady v. Middle Country Sch. Dist No. 11, 556 F. Supp. 2d 196, 200 (E.D.N.Y 2008).
132. Mavrinac v. Emergency Med. Assoc., No. 04-1880, 2007 WL 2908007 at *9 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 2,
2007) (concluding that "Bazemore is more applicable to this case than Ledbetter"). Accord Hulteen v.
AT & T Corp., 498 F.3d 1001 n.5 (9th Cir. 2007) (considering the effects of an allegedly discriminatory
retirement plan, holding "Ledbetter, as the Court's most recent pronouncement on Title VII, is
relevant, but does not control this appeal."). See also Pat Huval Rest. & Oyster Bar, Inc. v. United
States, 547 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1361–62 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2008) (new cause of action accrued every time
payments were made pursuant to "a facially discriminatory . . . statutory scheme").
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employer's adoption and intentional retention of a facially discriminatory pay
structure."133
The District Court of Connecticut found yet another way to reject an
employer's argument that Ledbetter required dismissal of a disparate pay claim
before it.134 In Osborn v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., as in Ledbetter, the plaintiff
complained that she was being paid less than male employees doing similar
work.135 There was no question that the employee was aware of the employer's
decision to allow the disparity because she had repeatedly complained about
it.136 Therefore, on the strength of Ledbetter, the court could have decided that the
plaintiff should have filed her claim the first time she received disparate pay.137
Following Ledbetter's directive that the limitations period begins to run at the
time of the "pay-setting decision," the Osborn court could have decided that
Osborn's claim was barred.138 The Osborn court refused to apply Ledbetter,
however, holding that the employer's continued adherence to the pay-setting
decision, made outside the limitations period, was proof enough of
"discriminatory conduct," thereby saving the plaintiff's claim.139
Like the O'Grady court had done, the Osborn court suggested that if
Ledbetter had litigated her claim differently, it might have survived: There, the
plaintiff "ma[de] no claim that intentionally discriminatory conduct occurred
during the charging period," but rather "argue[d] simply that [defendant's]
present conduct during the charging period gave present effect to
discriminatory conduct outside of that period."140 These cases suggest that on
facts similar to the Ledbetter facts, with proof of discriminatory actions taken
either inside or outside the limitations period, a plaintiff can state a timely claim.
Discrimination, however, may be difficult to prove, given "the realities of the
workplace," which is why the "act" or "occurrence" that triggers the start of a
limitations period must be determined according to the facts of each case.141
V. THE "REALITIES OF THE WORKPLACE" DEMAND THE APPLICATION OF THE
DISCOVERY RULE TO DETERMINE THE STATE OF A LIMITATIONS PERIOD
"A worker knows immediately if she is denied a promotion or transfer, if
she is fired or refused employment. . . . When an employer makes a decision of
such open and definitive character, an employee can immediately seek out an

133. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2174 (2007). See also Brantley v.
Muscogee County Sch. Dist., No. 4:06-89, 2008 WL 794778, at *6 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 20, 2008) (holding
that because the plaintiff did not rely on a "pay structure that was facially discriminatory," he could
not rely on when he received the paychecks from that structure to save his claim on limitations
grounds).
134. Osborn v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 518 F. Supp. 2d 377 (D. Conn. 2007).
135. Id. at 382–83.
136. Id. at 389.
137. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2169 ("Ledbetter should have filed an EEOC charge within 180 days
after each allegedly discriminatory pay decision was made and communicated to her.").
138. Id. at 2165.
139. Osborn, 518 F. Supp. 2d at 389.
140. Id. (citing Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2169 (2007)).
141. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2181 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

ZISK_FMT1.DOC

152 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

1/21/2009 12:42:50 PM

Volume 16:137 2009

explanation and evaluate it for pretext."142 It is harder, though, for an employee
to know of compensation disparities because they "are often hidden from
sight."143 Moreover, as made clear by the facts that the Ledbetter plaintiff faced, it
is often the case that an employee may receive a pay raise but, unknown to her,
her male counterparts receive a higher one.144 Indeed, even if an employee
suspects that she is being paid a lower salary than she deserves, or that it is
lower than her male counterparts, "the amount involved may seem too small, or
the employer's intent too ambiguous, to make the issue immediately
actionable—or winnable."145
Employees do not ordinarily know what each other earns, because
employees do not usually discuss their salaries.146 In addition, while it is the rare
case where an employer will lie to an employee about what others make, it is
often the case that employers do not share salary information with its
employees.147 The plaintiff in Ledbetter did not raise the issue of whether or how
she could have known that her employer discriminated against her when she
received her performance evaluations and the Court did note: "We have
previously declined to address whether Title VII suits are amenable to a
discovery rule."148 However, two circuit courts of appeals have adopted that rule
in age discrimination claims, and at least one district court has applied it to a
Title VII claim.149
Both the Third and the Seventh Circuits have noted that the Supreme Court
in Del. State Coll. v. Ricks150 implicitly acknowledged the application of the
discovery rule to discrimination claims by noting that the statute of limitations
began to run "at the time the [alleged discriminatory] tenure decision was made
and communicated to Ricks."151 Thus, the facts of each case should determine each
outcome. As stated by the two circuit courts of appeal: "There will, of course, be
times when the aggrieved person learns of the alleged unlawful employment
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 2182.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 2181. See also Bierman & Gely, supra note 1, at 168.
147. See Mavrinac v. Emergency Med. Assoc. of Pittsburgh, No. 04-1880, 2007 WL 2908007 (W.D.
Pa. Oct. 2, 2007) (plaintiff argued that she was entitled to equitable tolling because defendants
misrepresented her eligibility to receive a salary increase for additional emergency medicine
certification and failed to disclose that the policy was not uniformly applied); Dodd v. Dyke Indus.,
Inc., 518 F. Supp. 2d 970 (W.D. Ky. 2007) (plaintiff's cause of action accrued when he discovered the
fraud in the performance of a compensation agreement). Compare Goodwin v. General Motors Corp.,
275 F.3d 1005, 1008–09 (10th Cir. 2002) (plaintiff did not know what her colleagues earned until a
printout listing of salaries appeared on her desk, seven years after her starting salary was set lower
than her co-workers' salaries) (cited in Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2181); McMillan v. Mass. Soc. for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 140 F.3d 288, 296 (1st Cir. 1998) (cited in Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at
2181) (noting that plaintiff worked for employer for years before discovering pay disparity only
when a newspaper published the salaries of positions like hers).
148. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2177 (2007).
149. Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380 (3d Cir. 1994); Cada v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446 (7th Cir. 1990); Ohemeng v. Del. State Coll., 643 F. Supp. 1575, 1580
(D. Del. 1986) (applying discovery rule in Title VII setting).
150. 449 U.S. 250 (1980).
151. Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1386 n.5 (emphasis in original); Cada, 920 F.2d at 450.
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practice, for example, at the very moment the unlawful employment practice
occurs; in such cases the statutory period begins to run upon the occurrence of
the alleged unlawful employment practice. However, there will also be
occasions when an aggrieved person does not discover the occurrence of the
alleged unlawful employment practice until some time after it occurred. The
discovery rule functions in this latter scenario to postpone the beginning of the
statutory limitations period from the date when the alleged unlawful
employment practice occurred, to the date when the plaintiff actually
discovered he or she had been injured."152
Rather than applying the rule announced in Ledbetter that a pay
discrimination claim accrues "when the pay-setting decision" is made, without
regard to when the employee actually knows of the disparity or the
discriminatory reason behind it, the discovery rule must be part of any analysis
of these claims. "Typically in a federal question case, and in the absence of any
contrary directive from Congress, courts employ the federal 'discovery rule' to
determine when the federal claim accrues for limitations purposes."153 Under
this rule, a claim will accrue when the plaintiff discovers, or with due diligence
should have discovered, the injury that forms the basis for the claim.154 The rule
should be the same for discrimination claims and all other federal causes of
action: "A claim accrues in a federal cause of action as soon as a potential
claimant either is aware, or should be aware, of the existence of and source of an
injury.155 This rule should be the next step after Ledbetter in the evolution of pay
discrimination law and could be applied to any pay discrimination claim where
the facts support an employee's claim that she did not and could not have
discovered that her pay was below what others in similar positions were making
and that the reason for this disparity was discrimination.
VI. CONCLUSION
As the Supreme Court in Ricks made clear, a decision that will adversely
affect the employee must be "made and communicated" to the employee to
trigger the limitations period.156 This rule will allow for consistency and fairness
to all employees given the realities of the workplace. Where a discriminatory
pay-setting decision is made, but the employee has no way of knowing that it is
discriminatory because she actually receives a raise pursuant to that decision or
the employer offers other reasons for denying her one, Ledbetter's holding

152. Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1386; Cada, 920 F.2d at 450.
153. Romero v. Allstate Corp., 404 F.3d 212, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).
154. Id. See also Podobnik v. U.S. Postal Serv., 409 F.3d 584, 590 (3d Cir. 2005) (the discovery rule
delays the initial running of the statute of limitations, but only until the plaintiff has discovered: (1)
that he has been injured, and (2) that this injury has been caused by another party's conduct)
(citations omitted).
155. Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1386 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing
Keystone Ins. Co. v. Houghton, 863 F.2d 1125, 1127 (3d Cir. 1988)) (stating this general proposition in
the context of determining the accrual date of a RICO cause of action).
156. Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980).
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should not control and the limitations period should not start to run.157 The
limitations period should be triggered when an employee discovers or should
discover the disparity in pay, whether the "act" that leads to that discovery is a
decision to award raises, or set salaries, or when employees are talking at lunch
and someone mentions the size of his or his co-worker's paycheck. When it
becomes a "foregone conclusion" that an employee in a protected class will
receive less pay than an employee outside of that class, performing similar
work, and thus, the employee is aware or should be aware of that disparity and
the reasons for it, then Ledbetter controls.158

157. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2182 (2007) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) ("Having received a pay increase, the female employee is unlikely to discern at once that
she has experienced an adverse employment decision.").
158. Coghlan v. Peters, 555 F. Supp. 2d 187, 199 (D.D.C. 2008).

